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ABSTRACT 
This study empirically examined the impact of audit committee objectivity (contingent on 
CEO Power) on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking Sector. The study 
adopted a survey research approach and secondary data extracted from financial statement. The 
OLS and LSDV analysis were used to investigate the impact of Audit Committee objectivity on 
the quality of financial reporting with or without CEO power and influence. The findings 
showed, that, while audit committee independence impact positively on the relevance and 
reliability of financial report, the same cannot be said when there was CEO power. CEO power 
in the audit committee mitigated the benefits of independence and caused its overall effects on 
financial reporting quality of no significant in terms of relevance and reliability. The study 
therefore recommended that having a majority of independent directors would increase the 
quality of board oversight, lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest and helps to 
repose inventors’ confidence especially foreign investors that would invariably draft in FDI. 
This will align boards’ decisions with the interests of shareholders they represent. This will 
reduce significantly the ability of the CEO overbearing influence on the committee activities in 
ensuring financial reporting quality.  
Keywords: Audit Committee Objectivity, CEO Power, Financial Reporting Quality, Banking 
Sector, Nigeria. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, the governance of companies has witnessed diverse reforms, 
which were largely influenced by the high-profile corporate fiascos characterized by weak 
governance structure. The global response has emphasized on the introduction of stouter 
governance structure with the motive to further prevent scandals and promote financial reporting 
quality. In Nigeria for instance, a code of corporate governance for Banks was issued following 
the consolidation programme in 2005, which was targeted to enhance the corporate governance 
structure in the banking industry. Prior this event, the corporate governance structures were 
considered to be notably weak while board members were unaware of their responsibilities both 
statutory and fiduciary duties (Nigerian Corporate Governance, 2011). Interestingly, audit 
committees have been recognized as a prominent mechanism to enhance transparency and 
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integrity in reporting of firms (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002). These committees are basically saddled 
with the responsibility to “independently verify and safeguard the integrity of their financial 
reporting” duties (Nigerian Corporate Governance, 2011).  
Over the last two decades, the governance of companies has witnessed diverse reforms, 
which were largely influenced by the high-profile corporate fiascos characterized by weak 
governance structure. The global response has emphasized on the introduction of stouter 
governance structure with the motive to further prevent scandals and promote financial reporting 
quality. In Nigeria for instance, a code of corporate governance for Banks was issued following 
the consolidation programme in 2005, which was targeted to enhance the corporate governance 
structure in the banking industry. Prior this event, the corporate governance structures were 
considered to be notably weak while board members were unaware of their responsibilities both 
statutory and fiduciary duties (Nigerian Corporate Governance Code, 2011). Interestingly, audit 
committees have been recognized as a prominent mechanism to enhance transparency and 
integrity in reporting of firms (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002). These committees are basically saddled 
with the responsibility to “independently verify and safeguard the integrity of their financial 
reporting” duties (Nigerian Corporate Governance, 2011).  
In Nigeria, the Security and Exchange Commission Code 2003 recognized the presence 
of the CEO or any of its family members on the audit committee. Of course, this led to various 
financial scandals (motivated by the CEOs and other managements) which brought about the 
reduction of money deposit banks from 89 to 25 through consolidation. However, the 2011 SEC 
Code sought to improve on the previous code by ensuring that CEOs or their family members are 
not represented on the audit committee board (Ojeka et al., 2015). But as interesting as this new 
provision may be, the CEOs in Nigeria especially in the banking sector (termed “powerful”) still 
continues to constantly seek to interfere in what the audit committee does. This assertion could 
also be attributed to the fact that, some of the CEOs were the promoters/founders of those banks 
and they still maintain controlling interests. This could be due to the fact that, the nomination of 
an audit committee members which is seeing as “juicy” position, are masterminded by the CEOs 
hence the ability to sustain the loyalty of the members who have been saddled with the 
responsibility to provide controls, checks and ensure that the interests of stakeholders are 
protected. 
Following the evolution of audit committee governance, a strand of literature has sought 
to examine the audit committee effectiveness, the influence of CEOs and the quality of financial 
reporting in developed and newly industrialized economies (Carcello et al., 2011; Ojeka et al., 
2017; Abbott & Peters, 2000; Iyoha et al., 2017). Those researches are highly motivated by the 
increased governance regulations and the importance of the audit committee’s effectiveness 
through identifying the number of the audit committee’s mechanism to enhance financial quality. 
As noted by Carcello et al. (2011) in their survey, the top management influence determines the 
audit committees’ effectiveness. They further affirm that although the CEOs are exempted from 
the nomination processes of the audit committees in the post-SOX era, they can indirectly 
influence the selected members on the committee, which could further impair the financial 
reporting quality. Therefore, a powerful CEO would not want to be tailored or monitored, 
financial expertise on the audit committee therefore are unlikely to effectively perform the 
monitoring function because the information sources they rely on are likely to be distorted by the 
CEO. Similarly, Lisic et al. (2011) argued that, when CEO power is sufficiently strong, even an 
audit committee with a financial expert might not be able to effectively perform its monitoring 
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duty in substance. In this case, financial expertise might not translate into higher monitoring 
quality. 
This study is undertaken to empirically examine the influence of audit committee 
objectivity in respect to the CEOs position on financial reporting quality in the Nigeria Banking 
Sector. Our study further contributes to the existing knowledge on these following instances. 
First, to our knowledge, this is the first Nigerian study to focus on the affluence of CEOs in the 
selection of audit committee’s member, which could impair the quality of the financial reporting 
in Nigerian banking sector. This is prominent since Nigerian governance regulations operate 
amidst of weak regulatory enforcement bodies, which could give the sector liberty to implement 
Code of Corporate Governance partially. Second, existing literature tends to focus solely on the 
CEOs power in the nomination process of the audit committees. However, this study further 
examines the scenario where the CEOs power is exempted, which compares where the CEO is 
directly or indirectly involved in the nomination processes and where the CEO is totally 
exempted. Finally, this study is not limited only to academic literature but it is also useful to the 
policymakers in Nigeria and elsewhere who continue to encourage their firms to aspire for higher 
standards. Therefore, by undertaking the comprehensive relationship between the audit 
committee effectiveness contingents on CEO Power on the quality of financial reporting in 
Nigerian Banking Sector, our findings can help policymakers to make further evidence-based 
verdicts onward. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature and 
hypothesis development and section 3 research methods; section 4 discusses the analysis and 
implications of findings while section 5 is the conclusion and recommendations. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CEO Power, Audit Committee Objectivity and Quality of Financial Reporting 
In response to recent major accounting scandals and corporate frauds around the world, 
there have been an increasing concern especially by the regulators about the effectiveness of 
audit committees in monitoring corporate financial reporting. One of the key significant reforms 
and intervention is the improvement of audit committee quality focuses on the financial expertise 
of audit committee members. The Blue-Ribbon Committee (BRC) in 1999 on improving the 
effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees came up and recommends that each audit 
committee should have at least one financial expert. Following the BRC’s suggestion, Sarbanes 
Oxley Act further recognizes the importance of audit committee financial expertise in monitoring 
financial reporting by specifically requiring a company to disclose whether there is at least one 
financial expert on the audit committee and, if not, to explain why not. The Act also 
recommended that the audit committee be comprised of 100 percent independent directors (Lisic 
et al., 2011).  
In Nigeria, the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 support the inclusion of at 
least a member with financial expertise but with the inclusion of one director in the committee 
which was reversed in the 2011 code to non-executive director. However, the CBN Code of 2006 
said the composition of the audit committee must be 100 percent non-executive directors which 
do not hold more that 0.1% of the paid-up capital in the organization. These are various measures 
to ensure the independence and expertise of the audit committee members in ensuring the quality 
of financial reporting which has been a challenge in Nigeria. 
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Prior studies focused primarily according to Lisic et al. (2011) on the form of audit 
committee financial expertise where they measure audit committee financial expertise as the 
proportion (or number) of financial experts on the audit committee or as an indicator variable for 
whether there is at least one financial expert on the audit committee and the impact on financial 
reporting quality without taken cognizance of the substance of the financial expertise. Beasley et 
al. (2009) in their survey evidence posited that it is top management that ultimately determines 
the effectiveness of audit committees. They further said that although Chief Executive Officer’s 
(hereafter CEOs) are not directly involved in the nomination process in the post-SOX era, they 
can still significantly influence who gets selected to serve on audit committees such that the 
governance process for improving financial reporting quality may be compromised. More so, a 
powerful CEO would not want to be tailored or monitored, financial expertise on the audit 
committee therefore are unlikely to effectively perform the monitoring function because the 
information sources they rely on are likely to be distorted by the CEO. Lisic et al. (2011) argued 
that, when CEO power is sufficiently strong, even an audit committee with a financial expert 
might not be able to effectively perform its monitoring duty in substance. In this case, financial 
expertise might not translate into higher monitoring quality. 
The process of selecting members, particularly the role of the CEO as posited by Carcello 
et al. (2011) can affect whether an audit committee substantially function independently since 
audit committee are selected from the board and Klein (2002a) finds that board characteristics 
have a significant influence on audit committee characteristics. They therefore posit that CEO 
involvement in selecting board members including directors who are subsequently appointed to 
the audit committee board diminishes the audit committee independence and in turn reduces the 
effectiveness of seemingly independent audit committee members and of audit committee 
financial expertise.  
In Nigeria, there is no such provision in both the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(2011) and the CBN Code (2006). The code is silent about who is responsible for the 
nomination. It is therefore presumed that the full board is responsible for the nomination of audit 
committee members. Attempt has also been made in Nigeria that the Board should comprise a 
mix of executive and non-executive directors, headed by a Chairman. The code went further to 
state that the board should be independent of the management to enable it carries out its 
oversight function in an objective and effective manner; the majority of board members should 
be non-executive directors, at least one of whom should be independent director (Ojeka et al., 
2017). 
The substance of audit committee characteristics was looked into in (Carcello et al., 2011, 
Iyoha et al., 2016). This has been seeing as notable exception in the literature (Lisic et al., 2011). 
They made use of pre-SOX data to establish how the CEO’s direct involvement in selecting 
board members affects the association between audit committee independence and financial 
expertise and restatements. They found that independent audit committee and the presence of 
financial experts are only associated with fewer restatements when the CEO is not involved in 
the director selection process and when CEO is involved, the associations are insignificant. 
Agrawal & Chadha (2005) maintained that a CEO’s influence on the board can reduce the 
board’s effectiveness in monitoring managers. The greater a CEO’s influence on the board, the 
less likely the board is to suspect irregularities that a more independent board may have caught. 
In the same light the presence of financial experts on the audit committee is only associated with 
fewer restatements when the CEO is not involved in the director selection process. When the 
CEO is involved, the associations are insignificant. 
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Agrawal & Chadha (2005) and Ojeka et al. (2015) also maintained that the appearance of 
independence and financial expertise do not necessarily translate into substance depending on 
whether the CEO is involved in selecting the board members. Shivdasani & Yermack (1999) 
found that when CEO is involved, firms appoint fewer independent outside director and more 
gray outsiders. They also find that market reaction to independent director appointments is 
significantly negative when the CEO is involved in the director selection and that nominees that 
are unlikely to monitor are chosen when CEOs are involved in the selection and whether there 
the CEO serves on the nominating or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer 
independent director into the board. 
Bebchuk et al. (2007) found that CEO power (measured by the fraction of aggregate 
compensation of the top-five executive team captured as CEO) is associated with lower firm 
value and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) also made known that CEO power (measured by CEO-
Chairman duality and compensation and audit committee memberships) is negatively associated 
with firms’ credit rating. Lisic et al. (2011) in their findings submitted that having at least one 
financial expert on the audit committee is negatively associated with the incidence of 
restatements when the proxy for CEO power is low. The association turns insignificant when 
CEO power is moderate. Moreover, as CEO power reaches high, the association becomes 
positive. They however maintained that having a financial expert on the audit committee in form 
does not automatically translate into more effective monitoring in substance and that the 
regulatory changes prohibiting CEOs from being directly involved in the nomination process 
may not have been sufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness. Rather, CEO power 
continues to have an impact on the effectiveness of audit committee financial expertise in the 
post-consolidation era.  
This can be seen in the statement of Sanusi (2010) that some banks’ chairmen/CEOs were 
seen too often have an overbearing influence on the board, and that some boards lacked 
independence; the directors often failed to make meaningful contributions to safeguard the 
growth and development of the bank and had weak ethical standards; the board committees were 
also often ineffective or dormant. Hence the reason for the failure in the banking sector that led 
to the removal of eight CEOs in Nigeria in 2010 by the apex body.  
HYPOTHESIS 
This paper therefore hypothesized that: 
H1: There is no significant impact of audit committee objectivity/independence on the quality of financial 
reporting in the absence of CEO interference. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study made use of items in the financial report to ascertain the impact of audit 
committee independence (contingent on CEO involvement) on the quality of financial reporting 
with reference to relevance, reliability and timeliness consistent with Rich (2009). The study 
adopted a census whereby the population size is the sample size. This represents the 15 money 
deposit banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Data used were accessed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange Fact book and the sampled banks’ websites, which contained useful information 
for the study’s data analysis. This study focused on the banking sector because it is a very crucial 
sector in the Nigerian economy in term of its market capitalization. Least Square Dummy 
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Variable (LSDV) was adopted to test the postulated hypotheses using the pooled the time series 
and cross-sectional data. The study also separated the financial reporting quality into relevance 
and reliability. “Relevance” was measured by calculating interval of days between the balance 
sheet closing date and the signed date of the auditor’s report stated in the annual report (Iyoha et 
al., 2013). The second quality of financial reporting is “Reliability” which is proxied by accrual 
quality. 
This study adopted accrual quality as calculated by adopting the formula used by (Leuz et 
al., 2003; Iyoha et al., 2013, Ojeka et al., 2015). The total accrual method adopted by these 
studies has been argued by McNicholas (2000) as flexible and allows for control of corporate 
governance and external audit attributes as additional variables. Therefore, a positive index of 
accrual quality suggests that the firm is engaging in income decreasing strategies and a negative 
accrual index indicates income increasing strategies. That is, the higher the index of accruals, the 
poorer the quality of financial reporting and the closer the index to zero, the better is the quality 
of financial reporting. 
CEO Power, Audit Committee Objectivity and Quality of Financial Reporting 
This is the model that measures the impact of audit committee independence on the 
quality of financial reporting in term of relevance and reliability in the absence of CEO 
influence. Using both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Panel Data Estimation technique that is, 
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV), this model can be stated in functional form as: 
ADLAG= f (ACIND, ACSIZE, ACMT, FMSIZE, FAGE, AUDTYP, CEOpwr*ACIND)        (1) 
TAQ=f (ACIND, ACSIZE, ACMT, FMSIZE, FAGE, AUDTYP, CEOpwr*ACIND)         (2) 
Models 1 and 2 can now be stated explicitly in the following form: 
ADLAGit=β0+β1ACINDit+β2ACSIZEit+β3ACMTit+β4FMSIZEit+β5FMAGEit 
                          +β6AUDTYPit+β7CEOpwr*ACINDit+µit                        (3) 
TAQit=α0+α1ACINDit+α2ACSIZEit+α3ACMTit+α4FMSIZEit+α5FMAGEit 
                       + α6AUDTYPit + α7CEOpwr*ACINDit+µit                                 (4) 
Using LSDV (Panel Data Estimation), the equations therefore becomes: 
ADLAGit=β0+β1ACINDit+β2ACSIZEit+β3ACMTit+β4FMSIZEit+β5FMAGEit 
                      +β6AUDTYPit+ β7CEOpwr*ACINDit + Q1ϵ1+ Q2ϵ2+…+ Qj-1ϵn-1+µit           (5) 
TAQit=α0+α1ACINDit+α2ACSIZEit+α3ACMTit+α4FMSIZEit+α5FMAGEit 
                      +α6AUDTYPit+ α7CEOpwr*ACINDit+Q1ϵ1+Q2ϵ2+…+ Qj-1ϵn-1+µit          (6) 
The parameters of the model are such that: 
β1, β2 …………………. β6>0;  β7<0 
α1, α2 …………………. α6>0;  α7<0 
and, 
Q1, Q2 …………………. Q6>0; Q7<0 
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i=1, 2 …… 15 and t=1, 2 ……10 
Table 1 shows the definition of variables used the specified models. 
Table 1 
DEFINATION OF VARIABLES 
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Dependent 
Variables 
  
Reliability (Total 
Accrual Quality) 
TAQ See Appendix. 
Relevance (Audit 
Report Lag) 
ADLAG Interval of days between the balance sheet closing date 
and the signed date of the auditor’s report stated in the 
annual report. 
Independent 
Variables 
  
Audit Committee 
Independence 
ACIND This is measured by the percentage of non-executive 
directors to the total number of audit committee 
members. 
CEO Power CEOPWR Five measures are used to capture this variable (i.e. 
g=1,…,5): Ownership power (Shareown), measured as 
the number of share owned by the CEO; Founders status 
(Founder), measured as a dummy variable where 1 is for 
a company with the CEO as the founder and 0 otherwise; 
if the CEO serves on the board’s nominating committee 
or if no nominating committee exists; 0, otherwise; 
Family affiliation (Faffill) measured as a dummy variable 
where 1 is for family member of the CEO and 0 
otherwise. 
Control Variables   
Audit Committee 
Size 
ACSIZE Whether the audit committee has three or more members. 
Firm Size FMSIZE This is measured as the book value of the total asset of 
the firm at the end of financial year. 
Audit Committee 
Meetings 
ACMT Whether the audit committee meets at least 4 times 
annually. 
Firm Age FAGE This is measured as the number of years the company has 
been publicly traded. 
Audit Type AUDTYP Type of auditor the firm is engaging. 
       Source: Adapted from Ojeka et al. (2014). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data presented involved tables and figures which were used for the descriptive 
statistics and correlation analysis and regression analysis for the hypotheses testing. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 
BANKS SAMPLED 
Banks Number of Years Sampled 
Access 9 
Diamond 9 
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ECO 9 
FCMB 6 
First Bank 9 
Fidelity 9 
GTB 9 
Skye 6 
Stanbic IBTC 9 
Sterling 6 
UBA 9 
Union 9 
Unity 6 
Wema 9 
Zenith 9 
TOTAL 123 
                                              Source: Field Study (2013). 
The Table 2 above shows that out of the population, only 4 banks had a sample of six 
years while others had a sample of nine years. The affected banks with uncompleted financial 
reports undertook mergers and acquisitions between 2003 and 2011. Hence, completed financial 
reports could not be found. 
Table 3 
ACCURAL QUALITY BY BANKS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Access 0.038725564 -0.0187597 0.236804 0.078884 
Diamond -0.01158999 -0.0850108 0.025115 0.030577 
ECOBANk 0.08725166 -0.0065349 0.447793 0.150425 
FCMB 0.088934902 -0.0033456 0.360823 0.149351 
Fidelity 0.000678792 -0.072637 0.059941 0.040913 
First 0.00920971 -0.0047697 0.080799 0.02698 
GTB 0.011350174 -0.0179838 0.106441 0.037131 
Skye -0.00959967 -0.0717172 0.010834 0.031075 
Stanbic IBTC -0.25965129 -2.4725091 0.091385 0.830402 
Sterling 0.003635555 -0.0053488 0.030942 0.014196 
UBA -0.13899607 -0.8179627 0.001021 0.290373 
Union -0.0451395 -1.3552905 0.953806 0.583981 
Unity 0.02734439 -0.0045257 0.148972 0.059879 
Wema -0.00378739 -0.0193588 0.01285 0.011485 
Zenith 0.001991674 -0.0049333 0.019595 0.007217 
                      Source: Field Survey (2013). 
Table 3 gives the accrual quality of the sampled banks. The indicators demonstrate that 
some banks engage in earnings management and losses management in one form or the other. 
The mean accrual manipulations are 0.04, -0.01, 0.09, 0.09, 0.00, 0.01, 0.01, -0.01, -0.25, 0.00, -
0.14, -0.05, 0.03, -0.01, 0.00 for all the banks respectively. The minimum range demonstrated 
negative sign for all the banks sampled that is, at one point in time within (2003-2011) all the 
banks engaged in income increasing strategy. This could be the impact of 17-man committee set 
up by Atedo Peterside in the year 2000 to identify the weaknesses of corporate governance 
practices with respect to public companies. In summary, the manipulations as revealed by 
statistics are income increasing and income decreasing effects because the signs of the indices 
are negative and positive. 
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Table 4 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE (OLS) AND LEAST SQUARE DUMMY VARIABLE (LSDV) 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE, PRESENCE OF CEO 
POWER AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 OLS LSDV 
 1 2 1 2 
Independent Variables 
 
 
 
 
Reliability (TAQ) Relevance 
(ADLAG) 
Reliability (TAQ) Relevance 
(ADLAG) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
p-value p-value p-value p-value 
CEOpwr*ACIND 0.007 
(0.132) 
0.894 
0.482** 
(0.041) 
0.046 
0.003 
(0.065) 
0.947 
25.852*** 
(3.441) 
0.000 
Control Variables     
FAGE 0.048 
(0.854) 
0.394 
26.950** 
(2.440) 
0.016 
0.047 
(0.837) 
0.404 
-27.055 
(-0.687) 
0.493 
ACMT 0.114 
(1.484) 
0.140 
19.237** 
(2.076) 
0.040 
0.109 
(1.408) 
0.161 
26.435*** 
(4.883) 
0.000 
ACSIZE -0.058** 
(-2.296) 
0.023 
2.696 
(0.311) 
0.756 
-0.063** 
(-2.396) 
0.018 
5.877* 
(1.651) 
0.100 
AUDTYPE -0.130 
(-1.503) 
0.135 
46.968 
(0.843) 
0.400 
-0.113 
(-1.359) 
0.176 
117.131*** 
(3.772) 
0.000 
FSIZE -0.015 
(-1.407) 
0.161 
-3.812 
(-0.859) 
0.391 
-0.019* 
(-1.802) 
0.074 
7.848* 
(1.638) 
0.100 
p-value 
F-test 
No of Obs. 
0.582 
(0.786) 
128 
0.081 
(1.928) 
128 
0.058 
(0.795) 
128 
0.000 
(543.172) 
128 
Keys: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Note: Numbers in each cell are arranged in the following order- Coefficient, t-values (in parenthesis), p-values 
and Std. β. 
From the Table 4, as expected, we find a significant positive coefficient between audit 
committee independence and relevance (ADLAG) when CEO interference in the activities of the 
audit committee is present. This means, even though the audit committee independence can 
enhance the relevance of financial reporting, however this impact is mitigated when the CEO 
power is feasible in the audit committee. That is, audit committee member with the appearance 
of independent may in fact only be independent when their selection to the board and audit 
committee was not influence by the CEO (Carcello et al., 2011). This also point to the fact that 
when CEO interference and power is rubbed off on seemingly audit committee independence, 
the audit report lag days is increased, thereby making the financial report less relevant to the 
users of the report. The value is significant at 10% level.  
Carcello et al. (2011) posited that the appearance of independence does not necessarily 
translate into substance depending on whether the CEO is involved in selecting the board 
members or present at every board meeting. This finding as reflected invariably supports the 
proposition of Carcello et al. (2011) and Lisic et al. (2011) which states that there is no 
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significant relation between audit committee independence and restatement when there is CEO 
interference.  
Comparing the sign of the β coefficients showed that Audit Committee Meeting 
(ACMT), audit committee size (ACSIZE) and auditor type (AUDTYP) were all positive but not 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% apart from AGE that was positive and significant. However, firm 
size showed an insignificant negative effect on relevance of financial reporting. 
In term of Total Accrual Quality (TAQ), the only significant variables were Audit 
Committee Size (ACSIZE). As expected, CEO Power (CEOpwr) on audit committee 
independence has a positive coefficient with reliability (Accrual Quality) of financial reporting. 
The implication of this is that, the higher the CEO interference (CEOpwr/interference) the higher 
the accrual quality and hence the less the reliability of the financial reporting. The result 
supported the proposition of Lisic et al. (2011) that when the CEO is involved, the associations 
are insignificant. Firm AGE and Audit Committee Meeting (ACMEET) were insignificantly 
positive against accrual quality while Audit types (AUDTYP); Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) 
and Firm Size (FMSIZE) had insignificantly negative coefficients against reliability (Accrual 
Quality) while Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) was negative and significant.   
However, the LSDV results (in term of Relevance) in Table 4, shows that Audit 
Committee Independence (ACINDP) when CEO interfered was positive and significant at 1%, 
5% and 10%. This means that CEO interference in the audit committee significantly reduces the 
benefit of having an independent audit committee. It also means that, CEO interference makes it 
difficult for the audit committee to operate independently because they need the CEO to get job 
done faster and accurately. The CEO cooperation towards the success of the audit committee 
cannot be over-emphasised. Consistent with Klein (2002a); Bédard et al. (2004); Irma & Abdul 
(2019) and Vafeas (2005) where they found that audit committee independence is associated 
with earning quality however the presence of the CEO can damage this benefit. In addition, 
Klein (2002a) posited that CEO interference in the audit committee activities can lead to board 
captivity. Lisic et al. (2011) also posited that when the CEO is involved, the associations are 
insignificant. The table further revealed that the control variables AUDTYP, ACMT, ACSIZE 
and FMSIZE positive significant coefficients while AGE showed a negative sign but not 
significant. But in the overall, the result was significant against the relevance of financial 
reporting.  
However, using reliability as the dependent variable, audit committee independence with 
CEO interference showed a positive sign but not significant. Though, the CEOpwr as a variable 
from Table 4 showed that it was not significant at 1%, 5% and 10 %, however, the sign was 
positive. This means the higher the CEOpwr, the higher the accrual and the lower the reliability 
of the financial report. In this study it is revealed that CEO interference in the audit committee 
independence reduces the reliability of financial report. Specifically, CEO interference 
significantly reduces the benefits of having an independent audit committee. 
Table 5 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE (OLS) AND LEAST SQUARE DUMMY VARIABLE REGRESSION 
(LSDV) ANALYSIS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE, ABSENCE OF CEO POWER AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 OLS LSDV 
 1 2 1 2 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Reliability (TAQ) Relevance (ADLAG) Reliability (TAQ) Relevance (ADLAG) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
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 p-value p-value p-value p-value 
ACIND -0.341** 
(-2.25) 
0.026 
-15.725** 
(-0.469) 
0.064 
-0.31107** 
(-2.139) 
0.034 
-38.466** 
(-1.310) 
0.019 
Control Variables     
FAGE 0.024 
(0.419) 
0.675 
36.926*** 
(4.478) 
0.000 
0.020 
(0.631) 
0.529 
41.294*** 
(5.862) 
0.000 
ACMT 0.135 
(1.531) 
0.128 
24.150** 
(2.198) 
0.029 
0.174** 
(2.284) 
0.024 
5.241 
(0.514) 
0.607 
ACSIZE -0.071 
(-1.296) 
0.197 
1.239 
(0.139) 
0.889 
-0.051** 
(-1.783) 
0.077 
-6.044 
(-0.786) 
0.433 
AUDTYPE -0.147 
(-1.495) 
0.137 
-22.463 
(-0.728) 
0.467 
-0.247** 
(-2.408) 
0.017 
19.630 
(0.707) 
0.481 
FSIZE -0.008 
(-0.717) 
0.474 
-13.155** 
(-2.835) 
0.052 
0.027 
(0.888) 
0.376 
-37.161*** 
(-6.867) 
0.000 
p-value 
F-test 
No of Obs. 
0.103 
(1.355) 
128 
0.000 
(4.208) 
128 
0.031 
(1.156) 
128 
0.000 
(6.405) 
128 
Keys: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Note: Numbers in each cell are arranged in the following order- Coefficient, t-values (in parenthesis), p-values 
and Std β. 
The Table 5 above explained the probability (f-stat) which showed that all the variables 
were jointly significant in explaining the changes in relevance of financial reporting 
(ADLAG/Timeliness). Consistent with our expectation, there is a significant negative coefficient 
-15.726 with a p-value of 0.0642 between Audit Committee Independence (ACINDP) and 
relevance (ADLAG) of financial reporting in the absence of CEO influence. This result is also 
consistent with Carcello et al. (2011) where they equally found a significant negative relation 
between audit committee and restatement when the CEO is not involved in the director selection 
process. 
In addition, comparing the coefficient with when there is CEO interference, it was 
discovered that, audit committee independence would reduce the reporting lag much more than 
when there is CEO interference. This indicates that financial reporting becomes more relevant 
when there is no CEO interference. For the control variables, AGE and AUDMT have significant 
positive result, but ACSIZE is positive and not significant while FMSIZE has a significant 
negative effect on relevance. 
Using reliability as the dependent variable in Table 5, the Audit Committee Independence 
(ACINDP) has a significant and negative relationship with reliability (accrual quality) of 
financial reporting in the absence of CEO interference. The p-value stood at 0.0263. While the p-
value when CEO is involved is significant at 5%, it was significant at 10% when CEO interfered. 
In the overall results, it showed that audit committee independence impacts the financial 
reporting quality from the two models. The result also supports the assertion of Carcello et al. 
(2011); Abbott & Peters (2000) and Iyoha et al. (2013) that CEO interference in the activities of 
the audit committee does not generally appear to be directly associated with financial reporting 
quality. Audit Size (ACSIZE) and Firm Size (FMSIZE) are significant and negatively sign, while 
AGE is positive but not significant. ACMT is significantly positive.  
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However, the LSDV results (using relevance) indicated that the dependent variable is 
consistent with our expectation showed that audit committee independence has a negative 
coefficient and significant at 0.0347 (p<0.05). Whereas under the CEO interference in Table 4, 
the coefficient was not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. The implication of this is that, when 
the CEO interference is removed from the activities of the audit committee, their independence 
can reduce the audit report lag days by 38 days, the impact that would make financial report 
more relevant for users to make whatever decision they want to make.  
The LSDV result using reliability (accrual quality) as the dependent variable, consistent 
with our expectation, we found significant negative relationship between audit committee 
independence on the reliability of financial report in the absence of CEO interference (p<0.05). 
The implication of this is that, audit committee independence would reduce the level of accruals 
of a firm only if the CEO interference is curtailed. Once accrual is reduced, the reliability of the 
financial report is enhanced. The Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) and AUDTYP showed 
significant negative coefficients with reliability with (Accrual Quality) (p<0.1 and 0.5 
respectively). This implies that an increase in the ACSIZE will reduce accrual quality to make it 
more reliable and AUDTYP which are the big4 auditing firms that are known for their quality 
service would positively affect the financial reporting in the absence of CEO interference. AGE 
and Firm Size (FMSIZE) also showed significant positive coefficients with reliability of 
financial reporting. 
These findings are in tandem with growing literatures for example, Bebchuk et al. (2007); 
Coles et al. (2007); Carcello et al. (2011) and Lisic et al. (2011) where they all agree that higher 
CEO power is associated with negative economic consequences. Audit committee independence 
is therefore seen as the most veritable quality in determining board effectiveness and it is critical 
to the ability of the executive directors to monitor management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). 
Though, Agrawal & Chadha (2005) failed to find a relation between audit committee 
independence and financial reporting quality, but they do find a significant negative relation 
between financial expertise and quality of financial reporting consistent with our findings. 
Financial reporting therefore becomes more relevant and reliable for investment decisions of the 
users when CEO interference in the activities of the audit committee which is saddled with the 
responsibilities of ensuring transparency and sound corporate reporting is reduced. 
Therefore, to determine the relationship between CEO interference (CEOpwr) and audit 
committee independence and how CEOpwr mitigate the roles and functions of the audit 
committee, a correlation test was carried out. The result is hereby presented in the table below. 
Table 6 
CORRELATION TEST OF IMPACT OF CEO POWER AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE 
AND THE QUALITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
  ACindp Ceo_pwr 
ACindp Pearson Correlation 1 -0.006 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.946 
Ceo_pwr Pearson Correlation -0.006 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.946  
The Table 6 above showed the correlation test and the level of significance of the CEO 
power/interference on the audit committee independence. From the table, a negative relationship 
was observed between the two variables. The result shows an r of -0.006 though not significant. 
This shows the weakening effect of CEOpwr on audit committee independence. 
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The result of the empirical analysis in Table 4 showed the (Pooled OLS and LSDV 
regression) of Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality when CEO 
interference is present with a coefficient of 0.007 and 0.003 (for TAQ) and 0.482 and 25.582 
(ADLAG) and p-value of 0.894 and 0.947 (TAQ) and 0.096 and 0.000 (ADLAG) respectively. 
The combine effect in table (4.08) shows (ACINDP coefficient of -37429 and p-value of 0.008). 
Therefore, the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant impact of audit committee 
independence on quality of financial reporting in the absence of CEO interference cannot hold 
and is therefore rejected. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Using both Ordinary Least Square and the Panel Data Estimator (LSDV) for 15 Money 
Deposit Banks in Nigeria over the period of nine years 2003-2011, this study examined 
empirically the impact of audit committee objectivity (contingent on CEO Power) on the quality 
of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking Sector while controlling for other audit 
characteristics and firms’ characteristic. A strand of literature has sought to examine the audit 
committee effectiveness, the influence of CEOs and the quality of financial reporting in 
developed and newly industrialized economies. Those researches are highly motivated by the 
increased governance regulations and the importance of the audit committee’s effectiveness 
through identifying the number of the audit committee’s mechanism to enhance financial quality. 
Focusing our study on Nigeria would help policymakers to make further evidence-based verdicts 
onward as regards to comprehensive relationship between the audit committee effectiveness 
contingents on CEO Power on the quality of financial reporting in Nigerian Banking Sector. 
The study revealed no significant impact of audit committee independence when the CEO 
interference exists. This indicates that CEO interference (CEO Power) damage the independence 
of audit committee functions. Audit committee independence is a pre-requisite to the success of 
the board. Functions and duties must be discharged without fear or favor but the overbearing 
influence of the CEO might compromise this stand. However, there is a significant influence of 
audit committee independence on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking 
Sector in term of relevance and reliability in the absence of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
interference (CEO Power). Whereas audit committee independence impact positively on the 
relevance and reliability of financial report, the same cannot be said when there is CEO 
interference. CEO interference in the audit committee mitigate the benefits of independence and 
cause its overall effect on financial reporting quality of no significant as it relates to relevance 
and reliability. In addition, for audit committee independence to have a significant impact even 
in the absence of the CEO, it has to be composed of one hundred percent of non-executive 
directors free from the influence of the CEO.  
The study therefore recommends that, although, audit committee independence enhances 
the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking Sector in the absence of CEO 
interference (CEO Power), more emphasis should be placed on ensuring that all the directors are 
independent directors. For example, the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee, convened in 2002 to recommend ways to enhance the accountability, integrity and 
transparency of NYSE-listed companies, stated its belief that having a majority of independent 
directors would increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging 
conflicts of interest. This will result in boards of public companies having a substantial 
representation of outside directors who do not have conflicts of interest with the company or its 
external auditor. The reason for this is to be able to align boards with the interests of 
 
Academy of Strategic Management Journal                                                                                                    Volume 18, Issue 2, 2019 
 
                                                                             14                                                                                1939-6104-18-2-357  
 
shareholders they represent. This will reduce significantly the ability of the CEO overbearing 
influence on the committee activities in ensuring financial reporting quality. 
Even though, this study has contributed largely to literatures on the implication of CEOs 
power on audit committee independence, it therefore also has its limitations which are 
considered as gateway for further research work in this area especially in Nigeria where this 
paper is a pioneer. The authors expect that caution should be taken when drawing conclusions 
from the findings. In the first instance, this study only captured the banking sector in Nigeria. 
Other studies could therefore look at other sectors that significantly contribute to the economy. 
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